

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 8982

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV, PBOR, JO, US, XF
SUBJECT: JORDAN AND MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS--AN ASSESSMENT

REF STATE 282733 AND PREVIOUS

SUMMARY: KING HUSSEIN HAS REACTED NEGATIVELY TO SADAT BECAUSE OF THE SUDDENNESS OF THE INITIATIVE, THE FACT THAT IT CAME AT THE TIME WHEN HUSSEIN HAD MADE PROGRESS TOWARDS GETTING THE ARABS TO GENEVA, AND MORE FUNDAMENTALLY, BECAUSE SADAT'S AND ISRAEL'S BEHAVIOR SINCE HAS HEIGHTENED LONG-STANDING JORDANIAN CONCERNS THAT EGYPT WILL, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, SEEK A SEPARATE PEACE WITH ISRAEL. HUSSEIN IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DAMAGE SADAT HAS DONE TO ARAB UNITY; HE FEELS THAT HIS OWN BEST APPROACH NOW IS TO ATTEMPT TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SYRIANS, NOT ONLY BECAUSE HUSSEIN HAS A STRONG TACTICAL INTEREST IN OFFENDING NEITHER OF HIS MORE POWERFUL ARAB BROTHERS BY SIDING TOTALLY WITH THE OTHER, BUT BECAUSE, MORE IMPORTANTLY, HE IS STRONGLY CONVINCED THAT A SEPARATE PEACE BY EGYPT WOULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STABILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST, FOR HIM IN PARTICULAR, AND INDEED FOR THE WESTERN WORLD AS A WHOLE. IN SHORT, THE AREA COULD BECOME
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INTENSELY RADICALIZED, THE ARABS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE EGYPTIANS) ANTI-U.S., AND THE JORDANIANS WOULD FIND THEMSELVES IN THE MIDDLE. THE JORDANIANS WILL BE LOOKING IN THE DAYS AHEAD FOR US TO ENCOURAGE SADAT TO CONTINUE PUSHING, AS HE MAINTAINS HE IS, FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT; FOR US AND CAIRO TO PRESSURE THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE THE KIND OF TERRITORIAL

CONCESSIONS IN THE WEST BANK THAT WILL PERMIT THE PALESTINIANS AND THE SYRIANS TO MOVE CLOSER TOWARDS ACCEPTANCE OF SADAT'S INITIATIVE; AND AT THE SAME TIME, TO CONTINUE SHOWING THE SAME SENSITIVITY TO HUSSEIN'S POSITION THAT WE HAVE SO FAR. JORDAN WILL BE EXTREMELY WARY ABOUT US PUSHING IT TO CAIRO PRE-MATURELY (OR TO JERUSALEM FOR THAT MATTER) AND ONLY TO HELP SADAT. FOR THE FUTURE: JORDAN WILL TRY TO OPEN HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT, AS WELL AS SAUDI ARABIA. THEY WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO TAKE A FORWARD ROLE ON THE WEST BANK IN THE ABSENCE OF REAL ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO MAKE TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS AND FOR FEAR OF OFFENDING PRO-PLO ARABS. THEY MAY SEE MORE VALUE IN SADAT EXPLORING WEST BANK ISSUE AT THIS STAGE BUT, DESPITE THEIR SATISFACTION OVER SADAT'S IGNORING OF PLO AND THEIR FEELING THAT MODERATE WEST BANKERS REPRESENTATIVES WOULD ULTIMATELY WORK TOWARDS ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN, THEY ARE STILL WARY OVER SADAT'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS WE BELIEVE ARE LEFT WITH SOME STARK CHOICES: TO SUPPORT EGYPT GOING IT ALONE WITH ISRAEL OR TO TRY TO BLOCK IT BY GETTING ISRAEL TO GIVE MORE TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH. AT THIS TIME, WE SEE NEITHER OF THESE ALTERNATIVES AS PARTICULARLY APPEALING, BUT LATTER IS BETTER THAN THE CONSEQUENCES OF A SEPARATE PEACE BETWEEN EGYPT AND

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ISRAEL. END SUMMARY

1. IN RESPONSE TO DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST, WE HAVE REVIEWED SITUATION AS SEEN FROM HERE AFTER SADAT INITIATIVES AND LOOKED AT THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. WE, AS PHIL HABIB RECENTLY TOLD A SUNDAY NEWS PROGRAM, RECOGNIZE OUR LIMITATIONS IN THE FIELD OF INSTANT ASSESSMENTS.
2. THE SETTING. THE SADAT INITIATIVES, WHILE ONLY BEGINNING THE PROCESS OF MAKING FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE SITUATION, HAVE SET UP A NEW NEGOTIATING TRACK. JORDANIANS HOPE IT WILL LEAD TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE; THEY FEAR (AND THIS IS THEIR DOMINANT FRAME OF MIND) THAT IT WILL LEAD TO A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THEY WOULD STRONGLY PREFER, INDEED THEY FEEL IT IS THE ONLY OUTCOME WHICH CAN BRING PEACE AND STABILITY TO THE AREA, THAT WHATEVER IS DONE SHOULD LEAD TO A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT. THEY ADMIRE SADAT'S COURAGE, AND THEY SEE IN HIS VISIT TO JERUSALEM AN ACT DESIGNED TO BEGIN TO MAKE

MAJOR INROADS INTO THE RIGIDITIES WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE VIEWS IN THE AREA ON BOTH PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE. THEY SEE TOO THAT WHILE SADAT MAY HAVE INDUCED AN ELEMENT OF YEASTY FERMENT IN ISRAELI POLITICAL THINKING, HELPED TO UNDERMINE THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENT THAT THE ARABS WILL NOT MEET WITH ISRAELIS AND DON'T WANT PEACE, AND CARRIED FORWARD AMONG THE AMERICAN PUBLIC A FAVORABLE AND IMPROVING IMAGE OF HIMSELF AND EGYPT AS ARABS WHO WANT AND NEED PEACE, THE BASIC ARAB POSITIONS ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT REMAIN THE SAME. SIMPLY STATED, COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS ARE STILL THE CORNERSTONE OF THE ARAB NOTION OF A FAIR PEACE.

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SADAT DID HOWEVER BEGIN A PROCEDURAL PROCESS OF UNDERCUTTING FURTHER THE PLO BY INVITING IT TO A CONFERENCE IT COULD NOT ATTEND AND MEETING WITH AND LATER INVITING TO CAIRO WEST BANK PALESTINIANS. THESE POINTS HAVE OF COURSE NOT BEEN LOST AMONG JORDANIANS--PARTICULARLY KING HUSSEIN-- WHO SEE THESE DEVELOPMENTS AS EVENTUALLY HAVING SOME PROMISE OF PROMOTING A MODERATE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP THAT THEY BELIEVE WOULD LOOK FAVORABLY ON GOOD RELATIONS AND EVEN AN ASSOCIATION WITH JORDAN.

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3. IN JORDAN THE PUBLIC, WITH THE RARE EXCEPTION OF A NUMBER OF LEFTIST-ORIENTED AND FERVANTLY PRO-PLO FIGURES, HAVE SUPPORTED THE SADAT VISIT; EVEN MORE THEY HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY THE KING'S STAND, WHICH TRIES OF COURSE TO MANAGE THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS UNDER THE SLOGAN OF PRESERVING ARAB UNITY, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING.

4. IT IS A TRUISM TO SAY THAT AS SYRIA AND EGYPT DRAW APART ON ANY SIGNIFICANT ISSUE, JORDAN BECOMES TORN IN TWO. ALSO, AS THE TWO MOVE APART, JORDAN TAKES ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE AS A LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS. THE JORDANIANS HAVE NOT OVERESTIMATED THEIR LIMITED ABILITIES TO INSURE A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES; THEY KNOW THE SAUDIS HAVE A KEY ROLE TO PLAY IN ANY SUCH OPERATION. BUT THEY ARE WILLING TO MATCH SAUDI POTENTIAL (WHICH IS OFTEN SLOW TO BE REALIZED) WITH A VIGOROUS AND FORWARD PERSONAL DIPLOMACY BY THE KING WHEN THE TIME IS RIGHT.

5. THE NEXT STEPS. JORDAN HAS NOT ATTENDED THE CAIRO CONFERENCE FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH ARE:

A) THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NOTHING TO BE SECRET

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GAINED IN THE WAY OF MOVEMENT ON A WEST BANK SETTLEMENT AS PART OF A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN WHICH JORDAN COULD PLAY A ROLE; IF THERE IS, THE JORDANIAN POSITION COULD WELL CHANGE. IF NOT, JORDAN DOES NOT WISH TO EXPOSE ITSELF TO ARAB CRITICISM BY OPENLY CHALLENGING THE PLO ROLE RATIFIED BY THE RABAT CONFERENCE UNDER EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP.

B) JORDAN IS NATURALLY CONCERNED THAT IF THE CONFERENCE FAILS, IT WILL HAVE TO SHARE IN THE BLAME.

C) IF SADAT AND BEGIN DECIDE THAT BECAUSE SYRIA IS NOT THERE THEY MUST GO ALONE, JORDAN COULD DO LITTLE TO DISSUADE THEM, BUT WOULD SHARE EQUALLY THE ARAB OPPROBRIUM.

D) JORDAN, BY SUPPORTING SADAT'S INITIATIVE, BUT STAYING AWAY FROM CAIRO, HAS SHOWN THAT SYRIA DOES NOT CONTROL JORDAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, BUT THAT THE DOOR HAS BEEN LEFT SOMEWHAT AJAR WITH RESPECT TO DAMASCUS.

6. BECAUSE THE JORDANIANS REMAIN SO VITALLY CONCERNED ABOUT IT, WE HAVE REVIEWED OUR OWN THOUGHTS ABOUT THE DANGER AND BENEFITS OF A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-

ISREALI PEACE. ON THE PLUS SIDE, WE SEE INDEED THAT IT WOULD SATISFY BOTH EGYPT AND ISRAEL--THE FORMER REGARDING ITS TERRITORY AND THE LATTER WOULD HAVE REMOVED THE MOST POWERFUL ARAB PLAYER FROM THE CONTEST OVER WAR AND PEACE IN THE AREA WITHOUT HAVING HAD TO TOUCH THE KEY ISSUES OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA AND THE GOLAN. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, WHILE IT HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN EASY TO GO OVERBOARD ON THESE POINTS, WE SEE THE FOLLOWING: (A) ISOLATION OF SYRIA WITH EGYPTIAN STRENGTH AND LEVERAGE SUBTRACTED FROM THE CONTEST, SECRET

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AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW OPENING FOR THE SOVIETS WITH THE GROWING NEED IN SYRIA FOR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGED SITUATION IN THE AREA; (B) INCREASED INSTABILITY SPARKED BY A MASSIVE RETURN OF ALL OF THE PLO MEMBER BODIES TO A TERROR TRACK AND PERHAPS RENEWED LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN SOUTH LEBANON AIMED AT INSTIGATING CLASHES WITH THE ISRAELIS; (C) SOME POSSIBLE SLOW DOWN IN SAUDI AID TO EGYPT, A PROBABLE STEP UP IN SAUDI HELP TO THE PLO AND SYRIA, AND PERHAPS INCREASED PRESSURE ON OIL SUPPLIES, PRICES, AND THE DOLLAR, AT LEAST AS A STARTER; (D) A RETURN OF THE SOVIETS TO A POSITION OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE IN SYRIA AS SYRIA BECOMES MORE BEHOLDEN TO THE SOVIETS FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES AND IS CARRIED ALONG ON THE RADICAL CURRENT; AND (E) POSSIBLE SERIOUS INTERNAL PRESSURE IN EGYPT LEADING TO DISTURBANCES AND PERHAPS SADAT'S REPLACEMENT. THE JORDANIANS WOULD SEE THIS, AND WE TEND STRONGLY TO AGREE, AS A PROCESS OF GROWING INSTABILITY AND RADICALIZATION IN WHICH EGYPT WOULD BE UNDER HEAVY PRESSURE AND JORDAN WOULD BE TORN AS NEVER BEFORE BETWEEN ITS MODERATE IDEALS AND PRESSURE FROM A GROWING RADICAL BLOC (WHICH WOULD BE POSSIBLY FUELED BY SAUDI FUNDS) WHILE LOOKING DOWN THE ROAD TOWARDS WAR WITH ISRAEL AS THE ONLY OPTION OPEN TO IT.

7. LOOKING AHEAD. SEVERAL ISSUES WILL BE OF OVERWHELMING CONCERN TO JORDAN AS WE MOVE AHEAD IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS:

A) WILL THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS MOVE AHEAD ON THEIR OWN TO FORM A SEPARATE PEACE? JORDAN

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BELIEVES THIS MUST NOT HAPPEN, THAT ALL OF THE KEY ARAB SECTORS, EXCEPT PERHAPS THE PLO, WANT A FAIR AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT AND THAT THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE SHOULD NOT BE EGYPT GOING ALONE. THEY HAVE HEARD WHAT WE HAVE BEEN SAYING ABOUT SUPPORT FOR A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. THEY WANT TO BELIEVE IT AND THINK THAT ONLY THE U.S. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS HAS THE POWER TO INSURE THAT AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE IS NOT THE SOLE RESULT OF THE SADAT INITIATIVE. IN THIS REGARD, WE BELIEVE THAT WHILE IT MAY BE UNTIMELY AND AWKWARD FOR US NOW, BEFORE WE ACTUALLY GET TO GENEVA, TO PUSH THE ISRAELIS TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GOLAN, IT MAY WELL BE FAR PREFERABLE TO TRY TO DO SO THAN TO FIND OURSELVES FORCED AT A LATER DATE TO TRY TO STAND IN THE WAY OF A SEPARATE PEACE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO ENCOURAGE SADAT IN THE BELIEF, THAT WITH U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT FIRMLY BEHIND HIM, HE IS IN A VERY STRONG POSITION TO PUSH FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT AND WILL RECEIVE FIRM SUPPORT FROM THE U.S.

B) THE JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN PLEASED BY OUR APPROACH THUS FAR TO CAIRO. THEY CAN UNDERSTAND OUR NEED TO GIVE SADAT FULL SUPPORT. THEY ALSO SEE WITH US THE NEED TO KEEP THE WAY OPEN TO ASAD. THEY WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LIKE TO JOIN THE CAIRO CONFERENCE IF THERE WERE A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE

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THAT THE ISREELIS WERE READY REALLY TO DO BUSINESS THERE OVER TERRITORY IN THE WEST BANK AND GOLAN. (OTHERWISE JORDAN, AS MERELY A CONFRONTATION STATE WITH A QUIET COMMON BORDER WITH ISRAEL, HAS LITTLE TO NEGOTIATE.) THEY WOULD STRONGLY PREFER TO HAVE WEST BANK PALESTINIAN (NOT NECESSARILY PLO) ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE IN SUCH CASE. BUT IF THE ISRAELI POSITION WERE MORE OPEN

TO TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE (THE EXACT POINT IS OBVIOUSLY VERY HARD TO DETERMINE, BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE, OVER THE LONG TERM, EVENTUAL RETURN OF MOST OF THE TERRITORY UNDER ALMOST ANY CONCEIVABLE SAFEGUARD FOR ISRAELI SECURITY INCLUDING POSSIBLY THE DEMILITARIZATION OF PART OF THE EAST BANK IN ADDITION TO THE WEST BANK), THEN JORDAN MIGHT WELL CHOOSE TO NEGOTIATE ON ITS OWN WITHOUT SYRIA OR THE PALESTINIANS (OR AT LEAST THE PLO). HOWEVER, IT HAS ALWAYS STRUCK US THAT IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS COULD BE DONE BY ISRAEL ON THE WEST BANK, IT SHOULD PROVE LESS TROUBLESOME THEN TO MOVE THE SYRIANS INTO NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GOLAN, SINCE GOLAN DOES NOT INVOLVE THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE WITH ALL ITS COMPLEXITIES OR THE SEVERE TERRITORIAL PROBLEMS FOR ISRAEL OF THE WEST BANK.

C) JORDAN WILL BE EXTREMELY WARY ABOUT THE U.S. PUSHING IT TO CAIRO PREMATURELY AND ONLY TO HELP SADAT. HUSSEIN WILL BE MORE WARY, AND A GREAT DEAL LESS INCLINED, TO MAKE A VISIT PUBLICLY OR CLANDESTINELY TO JERUSALEM. HIS POSITION "IN THE MIDDLE" WOULD COLLAPSE IF HE PURSUED SUCH AN OBJECTIVE, RAISING THE SERIOUS PROBLEM OF ISOLATION FOR NO PALPABLE RETURN. U.S. PRESSURE ON HUSSEIN FOR SADAT'S SAKE HAS BECOME SOMETHING OF A SECRET

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HABIT OVER PAST YEARS; OUR REACTION TO SINAI II WAS THE LAST SUCH INSTANCE. THE JORDANIANS SUSPECT THAT OVER TIME THE U.S. WILL BE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE, STIMULATED BY THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS, TO HELP SADAT BY IMPROVING ARAB PARTICIPATION AT CAIRO AND BEYOND. THEY ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE OFTEN TEND TO FIND IT EASIER TO LEAN ON JORDAN THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ASK THE ISRAELIS TO MAKE SOME SORT OF MOVE ON THE WEST BANK. THEY ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO RECEIVE LETTERS FROM SENATORS IN THIS REGARD. IN THIS THEY ARE SOMEWHAT TRAPPED BY THEIR PAST HISTORY OF MODERATION AND WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE, ALTHOUGH THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE (NOTED ABOVE IN PARA 5) MAKE THIS PARTICULARLY HARD FOR THEM. INDEED THIS IS WHY THEY HAVE USED THE FORMULATION THAT THEY WILL GO TO CAIRO WHEN THE OTHER RELEVANT PARTIES ATTEND AND WHY TOO THEY HAVE ACCEPTED WALDHEIM'S CALL FOR A FOLLOW-ON PREPARATORY CONFERENCE. OUR OWN FEELING IS THAT HUSSEIN BELIEVES ISSUE OF ARAB UNITY IS IMPORTANT AT THIS POINT (AND IT SERVES ALSO AS A READY SLOGAN TO JUSTIFY HIS MIDDLE POSITION) AND SO LONG AS THERE REMAINS POSSIBILITY OF HIS HELPING BRIDGE GAP

BETWEEN SYRIANS AND EGYPTIANS, HE WILL NOT WANT TO ATTEND CAIRO CONFERENCE OR FOLLOW-UP SESSIONS. HE IS PLEASED WITH OUR APPRECIATION OF HIS POSITION TO DATE BUT WOULD PROBABLY REACT VERY NEGATIVELY, AND DIG IN HIS HEELS, IF WE TRIED TO PUSH HIM CLOSER TO SADAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REAL MOVEMENT BY ISRAEL.

8. FOR THE FUTURE. JORDAN WILL TRY, POSSIBLY IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, TO OPEN UP HIGH-LEVEL COMMUNICATIONS WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT AS WELL AS CONTINUING CONSULTATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA. UNLIKE THE PERIOD WHEN FORMER PRIME MINISTER RIFAI WAS IN OFFICE, JORDAN WILL TRY TO MAINTAIN A SENSE
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OF THE POSITIVE ABOUT SADAT AND THE CAIRO MEETING WHILE ATTEMPTING TO BRING SYRIA ALONG WITH ARGUMENTS BASED ON THE NEED FOR ARAB UNITY BUT NOT WISHING TO APPEAR TO BE PUSHING. (INDEED HAD RIFAI BEEN IN OFFICE, HE MIGHT WELL HAVE PUSHED THE KING INTO VERY STRONG SUPPORT OF SYRIA.)

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JORDAN WILL COUNT HEAVILY ON THE U.S. KEEPING ITS COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE; THE KING WILL BE UNLIKELY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO ANY EARLY PRESSURE TO GET HIM TO ATTEND CAIRO UNACCOM-

PANIED BY REAL INDICATIONS THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION HAS BEEN MODIFIED. SINCE, FROM OUR VANTAGE WE DO NOT SEE THAT AS VERY LIKELY VERY SOON, WE WOULD THINK THAT CAIRO COULD BEST FOCUS ON WHAT-EVER SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE (VERY LITTLE PROBABLY BEYOND THE EGYPTIAN FRONT) AND, WITH A FINAL BURST OF ENERGY, CLEAR UP THE PRECEDURAL TANGLES IN THE PATH OF GENEVA.

9. MEANWHILE, JORDANIANS WOULD PROBABLY BE INTERESTED IN HAVING SADAT DO AT LEAST PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION ON THE WEST BANK ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS. IN PARTICULAR, CONTINUING SADAT'S ENCOURAGEMENT OF INDIGENOUS WEST BANK REPRESENTATION ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE IN THE JORDANIAN VIEW WOULD TEND ULTIMATELY TO MOVE JORDAN BACK INTO AN ASSOCIATION WITH THE WEST BANK, WHICH KING STILL VERY MUCH DESIRES. HOWEVER, JORDANIANS--REMEMBERING THE WAY SADAT PULLED RUG OUT FROM UNDER JORDAN IN FAVOR OF PLO AT RABAT AND GIVEN DEGREE OF LIP SERVICE SADAT HAS MADE TO A PLO-DOMINATED INDEPENDENT STATE--ARE

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PROBABLY WARY CONCERNING ULTIMATE EGYPTIAN DESIGNS REGARDING THE WEST BANK ISSUE AND IT IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THEY WOULD BE SUCKED INTO PROCESS WITHOUT REVERSAL OF RABAT OR GREATER TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE THAN ISRAEL SEEMS LIKELY TO PROVIDE (SEE PARA 7.B).

10. WHILE THE "GUARANTEES" THAT ASAD SEEMS ALWAYS LOOKING FOR ARE UNLIKELY TO BEFORTHCOMING, SOME REAL MOVEMENT BY THE ISRAELIS WOULD HELP, AND AS SUCH, MIGHT BREAK THROUGH THE PROCEDURAL UNDERBRUSH WHICH MORE AND MORE SEEMS ONLY TO BE SNARLED BECAUSE OF SUBSTANTIVE UNCERTAINTIES. JORDAN WILL OF COURSE BE READY TO TRY TO HELP WITH RE-ESTABLISHING SOME ARAB COHESION, BUT WILL HAVE TO DEPEND HEAVILY ON THE SAUDIS AND OURSELVES. AND WHILE SADAT AND THE ISRAELIS MAY WELL LIKE TO IMAGINE THAT THEY HAVE OVERLEAPED THE AMERICANS IN THIS PROCESS, OUR FIRM IMPRESSION FROM HERE IS THAT EVERY WAY THEY TURN ON THEIR OWN WILL SOONER OR LATER BRING THEM SMACK UP AGAINST THE NEED, IF THERE IS TO BE REAL PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE AREA, TO TURN ONCE AGAIN TO THE UNITED STATES TO SHEPHERD IT THROUGH.

11. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO CAIRO, DAMASCUS, JIDDA AND TEL AVIV.
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